13 LINKING PUBLIC HEALTH AND SECURITY AUTHORITIES

The country conducts a rapid, multisectoral response for any event of suspected or confirmed deliberate origin, including the capacity to link public health
and law enforcement, and to provide timely international assistance.

IMPACT:

Development and implementation of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) or other similar framework outlining roles, responsibilities and best practices for sharing relevant information among appropriate human and animal health, law enforcement and defence personnel, and validation of the MoU through periodic exercises and simulations. Countries have systems to conduct and support joint epidemiological and criminal investigations to identify and respond to suspected biological, chemical or radiological incidents of suspected deliberate origin in collaboration with States Parties’ Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), FAO, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), WOAH, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the United Nations Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons, WHO and other relevant regional and international organizations as appropriate.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION:

Evidence of at least one response in the previous year that effectively links public health and law enforcement, or a formal exercise or simulation involving leadership from the country’s public health and law enforcement communities.

Benchmark 13.1

Public health and security authorities (law enforcement, border control, customs) are linked during a suspect or confirmed biological, chemical or radiological event

Objective To strengthen the linkage between public health and security authorities for a rapid multisectoral response to suspected or confirmed biological, chemical or radiological event

01 NO CAPACITY

  1. No legislation, relationships, protocols, MoUs or other agreements exist between public health, animal health, radiological safety, chemical safety and security authorities to address all hazards.

02 LIMITED CAPACITY

  1. Identify sectors responsible for response to potential IHR related hazards (biological, chemical and radiation). *
  2. Identify points of contact to assist with the implementation of prevention, detection and response activities at government agencies across multiple sectors (such as public health, animal health, security authorities, agriculture, chemical, radiation). *
  3. Determine the roles and responsibilities for responding to various threats and other incidents of concern through a review of national response plans, policies and procedures, or other means such as an engagement meeting. *
  4. Assess risk of significant biological (and chemical or radiological) incidents of concern to the country. *
  5. Develop triggers for sharing information on biological threats or other incidents of concern (such as chemical and radiological) with relevant multisectoral agencies. *
  6. Establish an informal or formal communications process to share information, based on identified triggers, related to biological threats or other incidents of concern (such as chemical and radiological) among relevant multisectoral agencies (such as public health, animal health and security authorities). *
  7. Train staff on joint risk assessment and application of triggers, and sharing of information among all sectors relevant to hazards. *
  8. Develop and disseminate advocacy material to raise awareness of staff in relevant sectors about their role for the management of biological threats or other incidents of concern (such as chemical and radiological). *

03 DEVELOPED CAPACITY

  1. Establish communications with animal health and security/law enforcement points of contact who would need to collaborate in the case of a suspected deliberate event. *
  2. Identify appropriate activities (such as notifications, assessments, investigation, laboratory testing) for response to biological threats or other incidents of concern (such as chemical and radiological), which will be covered by a written protocol or MoU between sectors. *
  3. Develop logistical plans to include multisectoral agencies, including law enforcement, if appropriate, in the PHEOC. *
  4. Determine sample collection, transport, storage, security and testing requirements among relevant sectors (such as public health, security authorities, agriculture) for biological threats and other incidents of concern (such as chemical and radiological). *
  5. Finalize a written protocol or MoU that formalizes and institutionalizes interactions between relevant multisectoral agencies (public health, animal health and security authorities). *
  6. Develop SOPs defining the process and communication mechanisms for assessing and responding to suspected deliberate international events. *
  7. Develop training curriculum using country specific content (such as regulations/authorities, agency roles/responsibilities and case studies). *
  8. Organize advocacy events to sensitize staff from relevant sectors on roles and responsibilities during a suspected or confirmed biological threat or other incidents of concern (such as chemical and radiological) event. *
  9. Map capacities in relevant sectors for emergency preparedness and response to biological threats or other incidents of concern (such as radiological and chemical) to establish a baseline for collaboration.

04 DEMONSTRATED CAPACITY

  1. Conduct regular trainings in relevant sectors. *
  2. Conduct at least one health emergency response, or SimEx, per year that includes appropriate information sharing between public health and security authorities using the formal protocol or MoU. *
  3. Document findings of the response or SimEx, highlight the gaps and best practices, and adjust protocols as appropriate. *
  4. Conduct and document joint training of public health, animal health and security authorities to orient, exercise and institutionalize the knowledge of MoUs and other agreements related to all hazards. *

05 SUSTAINABLE CAPACITY

  1. Conduct and document regular joint training/exercise programmes at national and subnational levels for public health, animal health and security authorities to exercise and institutionalize knowledge of MoUs and other agreements related to all hazards. *
  2. Expand joint risk assessment, exchange of information, reporting and implementation activities to all levels. *
  3. Conduct an evaluation to determine whether information about events of joint concern is shared in a timely and effective manner at all levels as outlined in formal MoUs or other agreements/protocols, that the response is appropriate and effective, and that corrective action is taken based on evaluation. *
  4. Review and update the SOPs, protocols, MoUs, trainings, etc. for collaboration between public health and security authorities based on lessons learned from M&E and follow up from the implementation of recommendations. *
  5. Involve the country in international initiatives for linking public health and security authorities to share lessons learned and best practices during suspected or confirmed biological, chemical or radiological events at the global level. *
  6. Sustain linkage between security authorities and public health sector for joint management of suspected or confirmed biological, chemical or radiological events through ToRs for relevant security authorities.

* Participation and contribution of other sectors to action.

Tools

  • Multisectoral preparedness coordination framework: best practices, case studies and key elements of advancing multisectoral coordination for health emergency preparedness and health security. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2020 (https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/9789240006232).
  • National civil-military collaboration framework for strengthen health emergency preparedness. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2021 (https://apps. who.int/iris/handle/10665/343571).
  • WHO–WOAH Operational framework for good governance at the human¬–animal interface: Bridging WHO and OIE tools for the assessment of national capacities. World Health Organization and World Organisation for Animal Health; 2014 (https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/who-oie-operational- framework-for-good-governance-at-the-human-animal-interface).

  • Chapter 3.4 Veterinary legislation. In Terrestrial Animal Health Code. Paris: World Organisation for Animal Health; 2022 (https://www.woah.org/en/what-
    we-do/standards/codes-and-manuals/terrestrial-code-online-access/?id=169&L=1&htmfile=chapitre_vet_legislation.htm).

  • Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction. The Hague: Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; 2020 (https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/download-convention).
  • Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Information Circular. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency; 1970 (https://www.iaea.org/
    sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1970/infcirc140.pdf).
  • Guide to Participating in the Confidence-Building Measures of the Biological Weapons Convention. Geneva: United Nations Office for Disarmament
    Affairs; 2015 (https://disarmament.unoda.org/publications/more/cbm-guide).
  • Biological Weapons Convention [website]. Geneva: United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs; 2023 (https://disarmament.unoda.org/biological- weapons/).
  • Joint Criminal and Epidemiological Investigations Handbook (2016) International Edition. United States of America: FBI; 2016 (https://www.fbi.gov/file- repository/joint-criminal-and-epidemiological-investigations-handbook-2016-international-edition/view).
  • Biological Threat Reduction Strategy. Paris: World Organisation for Animal Health; 2015 (https://www.woah.org/en/what-we-do/global-initiatives/ biological-threat-reduction/).
  • Simulation exercises [website]. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2023 (https://www.who.int/emergencies/operations/simulation-exercises).
  • WHO simulation exercise manual: a practical guide and tool for planning, conducting and evaluating simulation exercises for outbreaks and public health emergency preparedness and response. Geneva: World Health Organization; 2017 (https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/254741).